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Anti-Marcion
But although Hermogenes finds it amongst his own colourable pretences[6482] (for it was not in his power to discover it in the Scriptures of God), it is enough for us, both that it is certain that all things were made by God, and that there is no certainty whatever that they were made out of Matter. And even if Matter had previously existed, we must have believed that it had been really made by God, since we maintained (no less) when we held the rule of faith to be,[6483] that nothing except God was uncreated.[6484] Up to this point there is room for controversy, until Matter is brought to the test of the Scriptures, and fails to make good its case.[6485] The conclusion of the whole is this: I find that there was nothing made, except out of nothing; because that which I find was made, I know did not once exist. Whatever[6486] was made out of something, has its origin in something made: for instance, out of the ground was made the grass, and the fruit, and the cattle, and the form of man himself; so from the waters were produced the animals which swim and fly. The original fabrics[6487] out of which such creatures were produced I may call their materials,[6488] but then even these were created by God.
Besides,[6489] the belief that everything was made from nothing will be impressed upon us by that ultimate dispensation of God which will bring back all things to nothing. For “the very heaven shall be rolled together as a scroll;”[6490] nay, it shall come to nothing along with the earth itself, with which it was made in the beginning. “Heaven and earth shall pass away,”[6491] says He. “The first heaven and the first earth passed away,”[6492] “and there was found no place for them,”[6493] because, of course, that which comes to an end loses locality. In like manner David says, “The heavens, the works of Thine hands, shall themselves perish. For even as a vesture shall He change them, and they shall be changed.”[6494] Now to be changed is to fall from that primitive state which they lose whilst undergoing the change. “And the stars too shall fall from heaven, even as a fig-tree casteth her green figs[6495] when she is shaken of a mighty wind.”[6496] “The mountains shall melt like wax at the presence of the Lord;”[6497] that is, “when He riseth to shake terribly the earth.”[6498] “But I will dry up the pools;”[6499] and “they shall seek water, and they shall find none.”[6500] Even “the sea shall be no more.”[6501] Now if any person should go so far as to suppose that all these passages ought to be spiritually interpreted, he will yet be unable to deprive them of the true accomplishment of those issues which must come to pass just as they have been written. For all figures of speech necessarily arise out of real things, not out of chimerical ones; because nothing is capable of imparting anything of its own for a similitude, except it actually be that very thing which it imparts in the similitude. I return therefore to the principle[6502] which defines that all things which have come from nothing shall return at last to nothing. For God would not have made any perishable thing out of what was eternal, that is to say, out of Matter; neither out of greater things would He have created inferior ones, to whose character it would be more agreeable to produce greater things out of inferior ones,—in other words, what is eternal out of what is perishable. This is the promise He makes even to our flesh, and it has been His will to deposit within us this pledge of His own virtue and power, in order that we may believe that He has actually[6503] awakened the universe out of nothing, as if it had been steeped in death,[6504] in the sense, of course, of its previous non-existence for the purpose of its coming into existence.[6505]
As regards all other points touching Matter, although there is no necessity why we should treat of them (for our first point was the manifest proof of its existence), we must for all that pursue our discussion just as if it did exist, in order that its non-existence may be the more apparent, when these other points concerning it prove inconsistent with each other, and in order at the same time that Hermogenes may acknowledge his own contradictory positions. Matter, says he, at first sight seems to us to be incorporeal; but when examined by the light of right reason, it is found to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal. What is this right reason of yours,[6506] which declares nothing right, that is, nothing certain? For, if I mistake not, everything must of necessity be either corporeal or incorporeal (although I may for the moment[6507] allow that there is a certain incorporeality in even substantial things,[6508] although their very substance is the body of particular things); at all events, after the corporeal and the incorporeal there is no third state. But if it be contended[6509] that there is a third state discovered by this right reason of Hermogenes, which makes Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal, (I ask,) Where is it? what sort of thing is it? what is it called? what is its description? what is it understood to be? This only has his reason declared, that Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.
But see what a contradiction he next advances[6510] (or perhaps some other reason[6511] occurs to him), when he declares that Matter partly corporeal and partly incorporeal. Then must Matter be considered (to embrace) both conditions, in order that it may not have either? For it will be corporeal, and incorporeal in spite of[6512] the declaration of that antithesis,[6513] which is plainly above giving any reason for its opinion, just as that “other reason” also was. Now, by the corporeal part of Matter, he means that of which bodies are created; but by the incorporeal part of Matter, he means its uncreated[6514] motion. If, says he, Matter were simply a body, there would appear to be in it nothing incorporeal, that is, (no) motion; if, on the other hand, it had been wholly incorporeal no body could be formed out of it. What a peculiarly right[6515] reason have we here! Only if you make your sketches as right as you make your reason, Hermogenes, no painter would be more stupid[6516] than yourself. For who is going to allow you to reckon motion as a moiety of Matter, seeing that it is not a substantial thing, because it is not corporeal, but an accident (if indeed it be even that) of a substance and a body? Just as action[6517] is, and impulsion, just as a slip is, or a fall, so is motion. When anything moves even of itself, its motion is the result of impulse;[6518] but certainly it is no part of its substance in your sense,[6519] when you make motion the incorporeal part of matter. All things, indeed,[6520] have motion—either of themselves as animals, or of others as inanimate things; but yet we should not say that either a man or a stone was both corporeal and incorporeal because they had both a body and motion: we should say rather that all things have one form of simple[6521] corporeality, which is the essential quality[6522] of substance. If any incorporeal incidents accrue to them, as actions, or passions, or functions,[6523] or desires, we do not reckon these parts as of the things. How then does he contrive to assign an integral portion of Matter to motion, which does not pertain to substance, but to a certain condition[6524] of substance? Is not this incontrovertible?[6525] Suppose you had taken it into your head[6526] to represent matter as immoveable, would then the immobility seem to you to be a moiety of its form? Certainly not. Neither, in like manner, could motion. But I shall be at liberty to speak of motion elsewhere.[6527]
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